University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 26
Issue 1 Fall 1996

Article 4

1996

Notes: Limitations On Who May Adopt: A
Natural Mother May Not Adopt Her Own Natural
Children Notwithstanding the Consent of the
Natural Father and the Children. Green v.
Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 656 A.2d 773 (1995)
Jennifer R. Terrasa
University of Baltimore School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Family Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Terrasa, Jennifer R. (1996) "Notes: Limitations On Who May Adopt: A Natural Mother May Not Adopt Her Own Natural Children
Notwithstanding the Consent of the Natural Father and the Children. Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 656 A.2d 773 (1995),"
University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 26: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol26/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

LIMITATIONS ON WHO MAY ADOPT: A NATURAL
MOTHER MAY NOT ADOPT HER OWN NATURAL
CHILDREN NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONSENT OF THE
NATURAL FATHER AND THE CHILDREN. Green v.
Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 656 A.2d 773 (1995).

INTRODUCTION
The right to raise a family is among those fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.) This right, however, is not absolute. 2
In many cases, the state has a vested interest and may intervene in
this relationship.3 This may be especially true in cases of adoption. 4
Because adoption did not exist at common law, Maryland has
developed a comprehensive statutory scheme governing adoption. S
Maryland law, however, leaves unsettled precisely who is permitted
to adopt. 6 Section 5-309 of the Family Law Article of the Annotated
Code of Maryland states that "/a]ny adult may petition a court to
decree an adoption.'t'J Case law, however, reveals that the phrase
"any adult" is subject to interpretation by the courts. 8 The issue of
I.

1. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer, the Court held that
constitutional liberty included not just freedom from bodily restraint, but also
the right to marry, to establish a home, and to raise children. See id. at 399.
2. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Supreme Court recognized
that "the family itself is not beyond regulation." [d. at 166. The Court further
reasoned that "[a] democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens,
with all that implies. [A state] may secure this against impeding restraints and
dangers, within a broad range of selection." [d. at 168.
3. Cf Lieberman v. Lieberman, 81 Md. App. 575, 588, 568 A.2d 1157,1163-64
(1990) (holding that the state has a strong interest in requiring a responsible
parent to support his or her children because otherwise the state is responsible).
·4. Cf, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-303(a) (1991) ("The General
Assembly finds that the policies and procedure of this subtitle that concern
adoption are socially necessary and desirable.").
5. See id. §§ 5-301 to -330; see also, e.g., Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 691,
655 A.2d 901, 902 (1995).
6. See, e.g., FAM. LAW § 5-303(b) (specifying the purpose of the adoption law);
id. § 5-308 (specifying the legal effect of an adoption).
7. [d. § 5-309(a) (emphasis added).
8. See, e.g., Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. I, 497 A.2d 142 (1985) (holding that a
natural father of a child born out of wedlock could adopt his own natural
child); Ex Parte Frantum, 214 Md. 100, 133 A.2d 408, cert. denied, 355 U.S.
882 (1957) (holding that petition for adoption was properly denied on the
grounds of prospective parents' advanced age); Venables v. Ayres, 54 Md.
App. 520, 459 A.2d 601 (1983) (holding that a deceased person cannot become
an adoptive parent).
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whether a child's natural mother is among "any adult" permitted to
adopt the child was recently addressed in Green v. Sol/enberger. 9 The
Green court held that "the General Assembly never intended for
natural parents to be permitted to adopt their own legitimate children."lo
When David Brian Lenick and Dorothy Mae Green divorced in
1983, Green, the natural mother, was awarded custody of her children, and Lenick, the natural father, was ordered to pay child
support. 11 In May 1991, the Circuit Court for Carroll County allowed
Green to adopt her children with their consent, as well as the consent
of Lenick. 12 This order had the legal effect of terminating Lenick's
parental rights. 13 When Lenick petitioned a Pennsylvania court to
relieve him of his obligation to pay child support, Maryland requested
a stay pending a Maryland court's determination of whether the
adoption decree was valid. 14 The Pennsylvania court subsequently
granted the requested stay. IS
A Maryland trial court vacated the adoption, declaring it void
ab initio,16 and the court of special appeals affirmed. 17 In a unanimous
decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the intermediate
court's decision, holding that, despite the consent of the father and
the children, the Circuit Court for Carroll County improperly allowed
Green to adopt her three legitimate children. ls The court thus determined that such an adoption is legally ineffective and may be vacated
more than one year after its making. 19
In so holding, the court of appeals followed the express adoption
policy of Marylancj20 as well as the majority of other jurisdictions. 21
9. 338 Md. 118; 656 A.2d 773 (1995).
10. [d. at 127, 656 A.2d at 777. The court further held that, if such an adoption
were permitted, it could be collaterally attacked at any time and, thus, vacated.
See id. at 131, 656 A.2d at 779. This holding will not be addressed" in this
casenote. Note, however, that the court of appeals cites no authority for this
proposition. A later Maryland case, Montgomery County v. Revere National
Corp., 341 Md. 366, 380, 671 A.2d 1, 7-8 (1996), cited Green for this
proposition and added that the leading case in this area was Kelley v. Town
0/ Milan, 127 U.S. 139 (1888).
11. See Green, 338 Md. at 122,656 A.2d at 775.
12. See id. at 123, 656 A.2d at 775.
13. See id. Green was named the sole parent of the children and the children's
surnames were changed from Lenick to Green. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 124, 656 A.2d at 775. "Void ab initio" means void from its

inception. See

BLACK'S

LAW

DICTIONARY

6 (6th ed. 1990).

17. See Green v. Sollenberger, 100 Md. App. 686, 691, 642 A.2d 324, 327 (1994),

a/I'd, 338 Md. 118, 656 A.2d 773 (1995).
18. See Green, 338 Md. at 118-31, 656 A.2d at 773-79.
19. See id. at 131, 656 A.2d at 779.
20. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-303(b) (1991). Section 5-303(b) states that

1996]

Green v. Sollenberger

203

There are, however, several troubling facets of the court's decision
in Green: first, the court departed from the plain language of the
statute; 22 second, the holding suggested, without further analysis, that
children could never benefit from the termination of their father's
rights;13 third, the court's decision espoused a rigid definition of
family and gave the state the power to intervene to enforce it;24 and
fourth, the decision fostered a dual system of adoption - one for
the poor and one for the rest of society.2S

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

the purpose behind Maryland's adoption law is, among other things, to protect
"children from unnecessary separation from their natural parents." Id. § 5303(b)(i).
See Green, 338 Md. at 130, 656 A.2d at 779; see also, e.g., Marshall v.
Marshall, 239 P. 36, 38 (Cal. 1925); In re Adoption of Kohorst, 600 N.E.2d
843, 847 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); In re Adoption of Graham, 409 N.E.2d 1067,
1069-70 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1980); Leake v. Grissom, 614 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Okla.
1980); In re Estate of Baxter, 827 P.2d 184, 187 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992);
Campbell v. Kindred, 554 P .2d 599, 600-01 (Or. Ct. App. 1976). But see
McDonald v. Hester, 155 S.E.2d 720, 721 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); Petition of
Curran, 49 N.E.2d 432, 434 (Mass. 1943).
According to section 5-309(a), "[a]ny adult may petition a court to decree an
adoption." FAM. LAW § 5-309(a) (1991). Yet in Green, the court held that
"despite the broad unqualified language of Maryland's adoption statute, it was
not the intention of the Legislature that any individual may be adopted by any
adult." Green, 338 Md. at 124, 656 A.2d at 775 (quoting with approval the
court of special appeals decision in that case) (emphasis added). This is contrary
to the language in Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 1, 12, 497 A.2d 142, 147 (1985),
in which the court, interpreting this statute, held that "[i]n view of the broad,
unqualified wording of Maryland's adoption statute ... we are unable to
conclude that the Legislature intended to prohibit adoption in all circumstances
by a natural parent of a child born out of wedlock." Id. (emphasis added).
The court relied on a rule of construction which ·states that "where the language
of a statute is clear, courts may not insert or omit words to make the statute
express an intention not evident in its original form." Id. at 10-11, 497 A.2d
at 147. Note, however, that the language in section 5-315 appears to place a
restriction on the term "any adult" by requiring that a married petitioner join
his or her spouse in a petition for adoption. This, however, was not the focus
of the court's discussion. A discussion of the appropriateness of this provision
is beyond the scope of this paper.
See Green, 338 Md. at 128,656 A.2d at 777-78. Upon further analysis, however,
the court may have been able to identify possible social benefits to the children
of having their father's rights terminated. See infra notes 155-68 and accompanying text.
The court allowed the state to bring suit to invalidate an adoption decree that
was consented to by all the parties involved. See Green, 338 Md. at 123, 656
A.2d at 775. In Green, the father and the children consented to the adoption,
as did the mother by filing for the adoption. See id.; see also infra notes 16988 and accompanying text.
Cf Roger J.R. Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat" Dads: The Problem with the
Direction of Welfare Reform, 15 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y, Winter 1994,
at 3 (suggesting that the current welfare system creates a "'dual system of
family law,' one for poor fathers and one for the rest of society"). See
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BACKGROUND

A.

Child Support Generally26
The general rule is that parents must provide support for their
children. 27 This duty continues even after divorce.28 Adoption, however, severs all the legal duties and obligations of the living, natural
parents. 29 The exception is that, in the case of adoption by a
stepparent, the natural parent married to the stepparent is not relieved
of his or her duties or obligations.30 In such cases, however, the
parent not married to the stepparent is no longer obligated to pay
child support. 31 During the process of a divorce, parents are often
permitted to come to an agreement regarding custody and child
support payments.32 The courts, however, have generally not allowed
one natural parent to voluntarily waive their child's right to child
support from the other parent. 33

26.

27.

28.
29.
30.
31.

32.

33.

generally Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System oj Family Law:· Its
Origin, Development, and Present Status (Part I), 15 STAN. L. REv. 257 (1964).
For the most part, child support is not within the scope of this casenote and
will only be addressed in a cursory manner.
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-203(b) (Supp. 1996); cj. Stambaugh v.
Child Support Enforcement Admin., 323 Md. 106, 112, 591 A.2d 501, 504
(1991) ("Generally, the duty to support one's minor children may not be
bargained away or waived. ").
The court may issue child support orders upon the divorce of a child's parents.
Sa?, e.g., Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 459, 648 A.2d 1016, 1018 (1994);
Stambaugh, 323 Md. at 108, 591 A.2d at 502.
Sa? MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-308(b)(2) (1991).
Sa? supra note 59.
Cj. Stambaugh, 323 Md. at 106-14, 591 A.2d at 501-05 (holding that while a
decree of adoption eliminates the father's duty to support the minor child
subsequent to the adoption, it does not relieve the father of his duty to pay
arrearage).
Sa?, e.g., ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL Dn.EMMA OF CUSTODY 134 (1992) (suggesting that approximately eighty to ninety percent of divorcing parents come to an agreement
regarding custody and child support); see also Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow oj the Law: The Case oj Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950,978-79 (1979) (suggesting that parents may even use custody as
a bargaining chip in divorce agreements and that the parent who has a stronger
desire for custody is often at a disadvantage in the bargaining process).
See Stambaugh, 323 Md. at 106-14, 591 A.2d at 501-05. The father in
Stambaugh consented to the adoption of his children by their stepfather in
exchange for the mother's promise to waive the father's liability for past child
support. Id. at 108, 591 A.2d at 502. The court held that this agreement was
invalid because it violated Maryland's public policy. See id. at 112, 591 A.2d
at 504 (citing as authority § 5-327 which forbids compensation in exchange for
adoption); see also Lieberman v. Lieberman, 81 Md. App. 575, 588, 568 A.2d
1157, 1163 (1990) (holding that "[a] parent cannot agree to preclude a child's
right to support by the other parent, or right to have that support modified").
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. B.

Adoptions Generally
Because the concept of adoption did not exist at common law, 34
Maryland has developed a comprehensive statutory scheme to deal
with adoption. 35 The primary consideration in an adoption proceeding
is the best interest of the child.36 The stated purpose of Maryland's
adoption law, however, is to protect all of the parties involved: the
children, natural parents, and adoptive parents. 37 One aspect of this
is that the adoptive parents are to be protected "from a future
disturbance of their relationship with the child by a natural parent. "38

Adoptions Permitted With or Without Consent
Generally, a child may be adopted with the consent of the
natural parents and, in some cases, even without consent. 39 Section
5-311 of the Family Law Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland
provides for adoptions with the consent of both natural parents and
the child.40 A child may be adopted without the consent of the
natural parents if the natural parents' rights are terminated by a
judicial proceeding. 41 Section 5-312 provides that in certain circumstances an individual may be adopted even without either the consent
of a natural parent or a judicial proceeding terminating the rights of
the natural parents.42
C.

D.

Effect of Adoption
The legal effect of an adoption is that the child is, for all intents
and purposes, considered the child of the adoptive parents.43 Fur34. See Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 691, 655 A.2d 901, 902 (1995).
35. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-301 to -330 (1991 & Supp. 1996).
36. See, e.g., Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 122, 656 A.2d 773, 774 (1995);

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

42.
43.

Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 469-70,648 A.2d 1016, 1023 (1994) ("[T)he
controlling factor, or guiding principle, in ... adoption cases is ... what best
serves the interest of the child; the paramount consideration is what will best
promote the child's welfare, a consideration that is of 'transcendent importance.'''); In re Adoption No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 113-14, 642 A.2d 201, 20809 (1994); In re Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 561, 640 A.2d 1085,
1<96 (1994).
Sa! FAM. LAW § 5-303(b).
Id § 5-303(b)(3)(ii).
Sa! ide §§ 5-311 to -313.
Section 5-311(b)(ii) calls for the consent of the individual to be adopted if the
individual is at least 10 years old. See ide § 5-311(b)(ii).
Sa! Id. § 5-311(b). In such cases, Maryland law requires the consent of the
executive head of the child placement agency that has been awarded guardianship over the individual, as well as the consent of the individual to be
adopted if the individual is at least 10 years old. See ide
See ide § 5-312.
See ide § 5-308(b). Section 5-308(b) provides that, "after a decree of adoption
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.thermore, "each living natural parent of the individual adopted is:
(i) relieved of all parental duties and obligations to the individual
adopted; and (ii) divested of all parental rights as to the individual
adopted. "44 "'Adoption decrees cut the child off from the natural
parent, who is made a legal stranger to his offspring. "'45
Given the drastic and permanent nature of the effect of an
adoption on the ties between the child and the natural parents,
Maryland law places a heavy burden on those seeking to adopt. 46
For example, section 5-313 requires a court to find by clear and
convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child to
terminate the natural parents' rights before an adoption is granted
without the consent of the natural parents.47
In Dawson v. Eversberg,48 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
remanded, without affirmance or reversal, a decree granting an
adoption to the natural father while reserving the mother's parental
rights.4) The court of appeals determined that the trial judge was
without "authority to decree the adoption and at the same time"
reserve parental rights in the mother because the effect of an adoption
is to sever the rights of all living parents not married to the adopting
parent. 50 If the adoption were left in effect, the natural mother would
have no rights to her children.51 Because it was uncle~r whether the
trial judge would have granted the adoption had he been aware of
the true effect it would have, the court remanded for reconsideration
of the matter. 52
Because of the harsh consequences of an adoption recognized in
both statutory and case law in Maryland, there is also great concern

44.
45.

46.

47.
48.
49.

50.
51.
52.

is entered: (1) the individual adopted: (i) is the child of the petitioner for all
intents and purposes; and (ii) is entitled to all the rights and privileges of and
is subject to all the obligations of a child born to the petitioner in wedlock."
See id.; see also Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 668, 691, 655 A.2d 901, 902
(1995).
FAM. LAW § 5-308(b)(2).
In re Adoption No. 10941,335 Md. 99, 113,642 A.2d 201, 208 (1994) (quoting
Walker v. Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 284, 157 A.2d 273, 275-76 (1960»; accord
Dawson v. Eversberg, 257 Md. 308, 313, 262 A.2d 729, 732 (1970).
See, e.g., Dawson, 257 Md. at 313, 262 A.2d at 732. This is particularly true
if the natural parent whose rights are being severed has not consented to the
adoption. See id. (citing with approval Walker, 221 Md. at 284, 157 A.2d at
275-76).
See FAM. LAW § 5-313.
257 Md. 308, 262 A.2d 729 (1970).
Id. at 315, 262 A.2d at 733. In Dawson, the adoption decree included the
phrase "nothing in this decree shall affect ... [the natural mother's] parental
rights ... as the natural mother of said infants." Id. at 312, 262 A.2d at 731.
Id. at 312-14, 262 A.2d at 731-32.
See id.
See id. at 314, 262 A.2d at 732.
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regarding who may adopt a child and precisely what effect an
adoption will have on a child's ties to his or her natural parents.

E.

Who May Adopt

Section 5-309 governs who may adopt a child. 53 "Any adult" is
said to have the right to "petition a court to decree an adoption. "54
The provision in section 5-309(b) which expressly permits adoption
by a single person is significant because it suggests that two people
are not needed to adopt a child. 55 While the language of this section
appears to be broad and unqualified,56 courts have provided a much
narrower interpretation. 57

F.

Effect of Adoption on Other Relationships
While adoption generally terminates the parental rights of all
living parents,58 there are exceptions. When a stepparent adopts a
child, the rights of the stepparent's spouse are not terminated. 59 Some
53. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-309 (1991).
54. Id § 5-309(a).
55. See id. § 5-309(b); see also Ex parte Libertini, 244 Md. 542, 224 A.2d 443
(1966); In re Adoption No. 90072022, 87 Md. App. 630, 590 A.2d 1094 (1991).
Note, however, that language in section 5-315 appears to place a restriction on
the term "any adult" by requiring that a married petitioner join their spouse
in a petition for adoption. This, however, was not the focus of the court's
discussion in Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 656 A.2d 773 (1995), and
thus, a discussion of the appropriateness of this provision is beyond the scope
of this paper.
56. See, e.g., Green, 338 Md. at 127,656 A.2d at 777; Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md.
1, 12, 497 A.2d 142, 147 (1985).
57. See, e.g., Ex parte Frantum, 214 Md. 100, 103-04, 133 A.2d 408, 410 (1956),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 882 (1957) (holding that while the age of prospective
adoptive parents was not a disqualifying factor, it was an appropriate consideration); Venables v. Ayres, 54 Md. App. 520, 533, 459 A.2d 601, 608 (1983).
But see Bridges, 304 Md. at 13, 497 A.2d at 148 (holding that FAM. LAW § 5312 permits adoption by natural father of a child born out of wedlock);
Libertini, 244 Md. at 543, 224 A.2d at 444 (holding that the law does not
require adopting person to be married or have been married).
58. See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
59. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-207(a) (1991 & Supp. 1996). According
to section 1-207(a),
[a]n adopted child shall be treated as a natural child of his adopting
parent or parents. On adoption, a child no longer shall be considered
a child of either natural parent, except that upon adoption by the
spouse of a natural parent, the child shall still be considered the child
of that natural parent.
Id.; cf FAM. LAW § 5-315(a) (stating that the spouse of an adoptive parent
need not be joined in a petition for adoption if the spouse is a natural parent
of the individual to be adopted and has consented to the adoption).
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states recognize similar exceptions following the adoption of a child
by a lesbian or gay partner. 60 Some states also allow a natural father
to use the adoption process to legitimate his child.61 These states
extend the stepparent exception, thereby allowing the natural mother
to retain her rights following the adoption of her child by the natural
father.62 For example, in In re Jessica W. ,63 a New Hampshire court
held that a natural mother could retain rights to her child following
the adoption of the child by the natural father. 64 Other states expressly
permit an adoption by the unmarried father or mother of the
individual to be adopted.6s Maryland, however, has not granted
specific adoption rights to the fathers of illegitimate children. 66
G.

The Current Debate

While other states generally have not permitted a natural parent
to adopt his or her own child,67 the court of appeals seemingly left
this issue open in Bridges v. Nice/y.68 In Bridges, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that an adoption that would cut off the
mother's rights might be permitted despite the mother's refusal to
consent where the father had already legitimated the child. 69 In
Bridges, Beverly Ann Nicely and Jerry Wayne Bridges, Sf. had a
son out of wedlock. 70 Bridges, the natural father, appeared on the
60. Sre, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); cf In re M.M.D.,
662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995) (extending stepparent exception to homosexual couple
living together in committed personal relationship despite the fact that they
were not married). But see In re Jason C., 533 A.2d 32 (N.H. 1987) (holding
that two unmarried adults could not jointly petition to adopt a child).
61. See, e.g., In re Jessica W., 453 A.2d 1297 (N.H. 1982); In re Adoption of a
Child by A.R., 378 A.2d 87 (N.J. 1977); In re A.J.J., 438 N.Y.S.2d 444 (N.Y.
Sur. Ct. 1981). But cf Dawson v. Eversberg, 257 Md. 308, 313-15, 262 A.2d
729, 732-33 (1970) (recognizing the statute currently codified as .MD. CODE
ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-207 (Supp. 1996) as a less traumatic approach to
legitimation under Maryland law); see also Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 1, 6,
497 A.2d 142, 144 (citing Dawson, 257 Md. at 308-15, 262 A.2d at 729-33»;
irifra note 74 (discussing Maryland's legitimation statute).
62. Sre supra note 61.
63. 453 A.2d 1297 (N.H. 1982).
64. Id. at 1300.
65. Sre, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 25.23.020(3) (Michie 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 99-104(3) (Michie 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-106(4) (1995); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-15-03(3) (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.3(4) (West 1987).
66. Sre, e.g., In re Malmstedt, 243 Md. 92, 94, 220 A.2d 147, 149 (1966); Dawson,
257 Md. at 308-15, 262 A.2d at 729-33 (assuming, without deciding, that a
father could adopt the illegitimate child).
67. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
68. 304 Md. 1, 497 A.2d 142 (1985).
69. See id. at 12-13, 497 A.2d at 147-48.
70. See id. at 2, 497 A.2d at 142.
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birth certificate as the father. 71· Soon after the birth of their son,
Bridges acknowledged in writing that he was the father and a
paternity decree was issued.72 When the couple later separated and a
custody dispute ensued, Bridges attempted to adopt his son and
thereby cut off Nicely's ties to the child. 73 The court suggested that
despite the fact that the effect of an adoption might not be precisely
the same as the effect of legitimation, Maryland's legitimation statute74
was '''not limited in its scope and application to matters of inheritance only,' but was legally sufficient" to establish a legal relationship
between parent and child. 75 Suggesting that an adoption of one's
own natural child was possible under Maryland law, the court remanded the case for a determination of, among other things, whether
it was "in the best interests of [the child] to grant the adoption [by
his father] and thus terminate all of his parental ties to his mother."76
This ostensibly left open the possibility that natural parents in Maryland could adopt their own children over the objections of the other
natural parent.
Other states, including Ohio, Oklahoma, and Oregon, generally
have not allowed a natural parent to adopt his or her own legitimate
child. 77 In In re Adoption of Kohorst,18 the Court of Appeals of
Ohio refused to permit a father to use an adoption proceeding to
terminate the mother's rights to her legitimate child despite the fact
that she had not contributed child support and had not made regular
visits. 79 Prior to Kohorst, an Ohio trial court had held that a mother

71.
72.
73.
74.

75.
76.
77.

78.
79.

See id. at 3, 497 A.2d at 143.
See id.
See id.
See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208(b) (Supp. 1996). A child born
out of wedlock is presumptively the child of his mother but not his father.
See id. § 1-208(a). Subsection (b) provides four ways for a father to legitimate
his child born out of wedlock. Id. § 1-208(b). A child born out of wedlock is
considered the child of his biological father only if the father:
(1) Has been judicially determined to be the father in an action
brought under the statutes relating to paternity proceedings; (2) Has
acknowledged himself, in writing, to be the father; (3) Has openly
and notoriously recognized the child to be his child; or (4) Has
subsequently married the mother and has acknowledged himself, orally
or in writing, to be the father.
Id
Bridges, 304 Md. at 7-8, 497 A.2d at 145 (quoting Thomas v. Solis, 263 Md.
536, 542, 283 A.2d 777, 780 (1971».
Id. at 14, 497 A.2d at 148.
See, e.g., In re Adoption of Kohorst, 600 N.E.2d843, 846 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992); Leake v. Grissom, 614 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Okla. 1980); Campbell v.
Kindred, 554 P.2d 599, 600 (Or. Ct. App. 1976).
600 N.E.2d 843 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
See id. at 849. In Kohorst, the father claimed that the mother had failed to
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could not adopt her own child thereby cutting off the father's ties
with the child, notwithstanding the father's consent. 80 The court
to support his minor children is a duty
reasoned that a father's duty
l
which he owes to the state and thus, the father cannot contract with
the mother to relieve himself of this liability.81 An Oklahoma court
held that a natural parent could not adopt her own legitimate child. 82
The court stressed the fact that an adoption in such cases would not
confer upon the child any additional benefits.83 Similarly, an Oregon
court invalidated an attempted adoption by a natural father that
severed the rights of the mother. 84
Several states, however, have found no legal impediment to a
natural parent adopting his or her own child.8s The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, for example, permitted an unmarried mother
to adopt her own natural child who was born out of wedlock. 86
Similarly, a New Jersey court permitted a natural father to adopt
his own child whose mother and legal father had died.87 A Georgia
court, likewise, held that natural parents are not precluded from
adopting their own children. 88
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has suggested that one parent
will not be permitted to consent to adoption in order to terminate
child support payment arrearage.89 Yet, Maryland's adoption statute
requires the consent of natural parents to the adoption of their
children by either a stranger or a relative,9O and for the adoption of

80.
81.
82.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

make child support payments. See id. at 844. The court, however, noted that
the judgment awarding the father custody made no such requirement. See id.
The father further claimed that he feared that the child would at some time
be adversely affected by her mother's "lifestyle." See id. at 845-46. The court,
concerned with the harsh consequences of permanently and completely terminating the child's ties to the mother, rejected the father's attempt to adopt his
child. See id. at 847-48. The admitted sole purpose of the adoption was
terminating the mother's rights. See id. at 848. The court labeled such action
by the father as "overkill." See id. at 845-46.
See In re Adoption of Graham, 409 N.E.2d 1067, 1069-70 (Ohio Ct. C.P.
1980).
See id. at 1069.
See Leake, 614 P.2d at 1109 (reasoning that the Legislature did not intend to
provide a proceeding for a parent to adopt his or her natural legitimate child).
See id. at 1109.
See Campbell v. Kindred, 554 P.2d 599 (Or. Ct. App. 1976).
See, e.g., McDonald v. Hester, 155 S.E.2d 720, 721 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); In
re Curran, 49 N.E.2d 432, 434 (Mass. 1943); In re Adoption of Adult by
G.V.C., 581 A.2d 123, 124-25 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990).
See Curran, 49 N.E.2d at 432-35.
See G. V.C., 581 A.2d at 123-25.
See McDonald, 155 S.E.2d at 721.
See Stambaugh v. Child Support Enforcement Admin., 323 Md. 106,591 A.2d
501 (1991).
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-309, -311 (1991 & Supp. 1996).
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a child by a single parent. 91 Moreover, in Bridges v. Nicely,n the
court suggested there might be cases where a natural parent would
be permitted to adopt a natural child, despite the fact that: (1) the
other parent's ties to the child would be severed; and (2) the other
parent had not consented to the adoption.93 Green v. Sol/enbergetJ4
combined these issues by addressing whether an adoption of legitimate
children by their natural custodial mother, but not her husband, may
be granted where both natural parents have consented and such
adoption would have the effect of severing the father's ties and
responsibility to the children.9s

1996]

III.

THE INSTANT CASE

In Green v. Sol/enberger,96 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
addressed the issue of whether Maryland's adoption law permits a
natural mother to adopt her own legitimate child, with the consent
of the other natural parent, thereby severing the relationship between
the children and their natural father. 97
A.

Facts

David Brian Lenick (Lenick) and Dorothy Mae Green (Green)
were married in 1979 and had three legitimate children.98 When they
divorced in 1983, Green was awarded custody of the children, and
Lenick was ordered to pay child support. 99 Custody remained with
Green except for a one-year period in which the children resided with
LenickYJO Lenick was consistently either behind in his payments or
failed to pay at all. 101 In 1990, the right to receive child support was
assigned to the state when Green began to receive Aid for Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) to help support the children. 102
In May 1991, with the consent of both Lenick and the children,
the Circuit Court for Carroll County allowed Green to adopt her
children, thus severing their ties to Lenick. lo3 Over a year later,
91. See ide § 5-309(b).

92. 304 Md. I, 497 A.2d 142 (1985).
93. See ide

94. 338 Md. lIS, 656 A.2d 773 (1995).
95. See ide at 120-23, 656 A.2d at 773-75.

96. Id. at l1S-31, 656 A.2d at 773-79.
ide
ide at 122, 656 A.2d at 775.
ide
ide
ide
ide
ide at 123, 656 A.2d at 775.

97. See
9S. See
99. See
100. See
101. See
102. See
103. See
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Lenick petitioned a Pennsylvania court to relieve him of his obligation
to pay child support. 104 At Maryland's request, the Pennsylvania
court stayed the suspension pending a Maryland court determination
of whether the adoption decree was valid.IOS The Executive Director
of Maryland's Child Support Enforcement Agency (State) filed a
complaint seeking to have the adoption vacated. 106 The trial court
concluded that "the complaint for adoption failed to allege that
substantial social benefits would accrue to the children," and vacated
the adoption, declaring it void ab initio. I07
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the judgment holding that "despite the broad, unqualified language of Maryland's adoption statute, it was not the intention of the Legislature
that any individual may be adopted by any adult, totally without
qualification or restriction concerning blood relationships." 108 The
court of appeals granted certiorari. 109

B.

Appellant's Claims

On appeal, Green, relying on the broad language of the statute,
argued that natural parents should be permitted to adopt their own
children because such an action would not violate Maryland law or
public policy.lIo She further urged the court to follow Bridges v.
Nicely, III in which the same court held that "[i]n view of the broad,
unqualified wording of Maryland's adoption statute . .. we are
unable to conclude that the Legislature intended to prohibit adoption
in all circumstances by a natural parent of a child born out of
wedlock. "112 Green claimed that the circuit court had erroneously
distinguished this case from Bridges. 113
Moreover, Green argued that given the holding in Carroll County
Department of Social Services v. Edelmann,1I4 adoption was her only
viable alternative. liS In Edelmann, the court held that the only way
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 124, 656 A.2d at 775.
See id. at 124, 656 A.2d at 775-76 (quoting Green v. Sollenberger, 100 Md.
App. 686, 691, 642 A.2d 324, 327 (1994), aff'd Green v. Sollenberger, 338
Md. 118, 656 A.2d 773 (1995».
See id. at 124, 656 A.2d at 776.
See id. (referring to MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-309(a) (1991) which states
that "[a)ny adult" may adopt).
304 Md. 1, 497 A.2d 142 (1985).
/d. at 12, 497 A.2d at 147 (emphasis added).
See Green, 338 Md. at 125, 656 A.2d at 776.
320 Md. 150, 577 A.2d 14 (1990).
See Green, 338 Md. at 125, 656 A.2d at 776.
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to terminate a parent's rights was through guardianship or adoption. 116 Green also noted that, although her husband did not join her
in the adoption petition, section 5-309(b) expressly allowed an adoption by a single person. 117
Emphasizing that the children's best interest is the overriding
concern in an adoption, Green argued that this adoption would serve
her children's best interest because it would protect them from future
disturbance in their relationship with her.1l8 She argued that the
children would actually benefit from the adoption because they could
never be held liable to support their father. 1I9 Finally, Green argued
that even if the adoption were invalid, the court did not have the
authority to strike it down because it had been more than one year
.
since the adoption was entered.I 20

The Court's Rationale
Despite Green's arguments to the contrary, the court held that
Green could not adopt her own children. 121 First, the court rejected
Green's interpretation of section 5-309(b), holding that "despite the
broad and seemingly unqualified language used in these provisions,
the General Assembly never intended for natural parents to be
permitted to adopt their own legitimate children.' '122 The court also
emphasized that pursuant to section 5-303, one of the primary goals
of Maryland's adoption statute is to protect the child from "unnecessary separation from their natural parents." 123 This goal, the court
pointed out, was not furthered by Green's adoption of her children, 124
as it severed the children's ties to their natural father.
Moreover, the court noted that "another primary purpose of
adoption is to create a legal connection between an adoptive parent
and child who are not biologically related, thereby conferring on
each legal rights and obligations that did not previously exist." 125
C.

116. See Carroll County Dep't of Soc. Servo v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150, 175-76,
577 A.2d 14, 26 (1990).
117. See Green, 338 Md. at 125, 656 A.2d at 776.
118. See id. at 126, 656 A.2d at 776.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 126, 656 A.2d at 777. Green cited section 5-325 which states that
"[a] court may not receive a petition to invalidate a final decree of adoption
because of procedural or jurisdictional defect unless the petition is filed within
1 year after the entry of the final decree of adoption." MD. CoDE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 5-325 (1991).
121. See Green, 338 Md. at 118-31, 656 A.2d at 773-79.
122. Id. at 127, 656 A.2d at 777.
123. Id
124. See id.
125. Id. at 127-28, 656 A.2d at 777 (emphasis added). The court, however, cited
no authority for this broad proclamation. See id.
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Importantly, the adopted children must acquire a new legal relationship or at least some social benefit. l26 The court concluded that
Green's children did not acquire a new relationship from the adoption
and, moreover, acquired no additional social benefits. 127
The court opined that the children were harmed as a result of
the adoption. 128 The court noted five losses that the children would
experience if the adoption were permitted to stand: first, the children
would lose their right to any current support from their father;
second, they would lose the right to future support from their father;
third, they would forfeit their right to take by intestacy from and
through their father; fourth, they would lose the right to bring a
wrongful death action on the father's behalf; and finally, they would
"lose the opportunity to have any sort of filial relationship with
their father. "129
The court also noted that the granting of such an adoption
would violate public policy.130 The court was particularly concerned
that Green's failure to include her husband as a party in the adoption
petition left the children "fatherless. "131 Significantly, this in itself
is a violation of Maryland's adoption law which requires the joining
of the spouse of a petitioner for adoption. 132 Failure of Green to
join her husband, the court held, was "clearly against public policy
and such a misuse of the adoption statute [would] not be allowed."133
Next, the court distinguished Green's case from Bridges v.
Nicely. 134 The court asserted that in Bridges the father had a legitimate
reason for undertaking to adopt his child, while in Green the mother's
purpose was clearly against public policy.13s According to the Green
court, the father in Bridges wanted to adopt in order to legitimate
his child who was born out of wedlock, 136 whereas the mother in
Green did not have any such appropriate purpose.137 The court further
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

131.
132.

133.

134.
135.
136.
137.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 128-29, 656 A.2d at 778.
Id.
See id. at 129, 656 A.2d at 778.
Id.
See id. at 129 n.5, 656 A.2d at 778 n.5 (citing § 5-315(a) which states that
"[i]f a petitioner for adoption is married, the petitioner's spouse shall join the
petition"). But cf. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-309(b) (1991) ("[C]ourt
may not deny petition for adoption solely because the petitioner is single or
does not have a spouse."); In re Adoption No. 90072022/CAD, 87 Md. App.
630, 590 A.2d 1094 (1991) (holding that law does not require that adopting
parent be married).
Green, 338 Md. at 129, 656 A.2d at 778.
304 Md. 1, 497 A.2d 142 (1985).
See Green, 338 Md. at 129-30, 656 A.2d at 778.
See id. at 129, 656 A.2d at 778.
See id.
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analogized Green to Stambaugh v. Child Support Enforcement Administration,138 in which the court held that it was a violation of
public policy for one parent to waive child support payments from
the other parent in exchange for that parent's consent to an adoption. 139
Finally, the court declared, with little analysis, that the adoption
was ineffective and thus voidable and subject to collateral attack at
any time. l40 The case was viewed as a collateral attack and, thus,
declared void ab initio. 141
IV.

ANAL YSIS
The court's decision in Green is troubling for several reasons:
first, the court departed from the plain language of the statute; 142
second, the holding suggested, without further analysis, that children
could never benefit from the termination of their natural father's
rights; 143 third, the court's decision espoused a rigid definition of
family and gives the state the power to intervene to enforce it; 144 and
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

323 Md. 106, 591 A.2d 501 (1991).
See id.
See Green, 338 Md. at 131, 656 A.2d at 779.
See id.
According to section 5-309(a), "[a]ny adult may petition a court to decree an
adoption." See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-309(a) (1991). Yet in Green,
the court held that "despite the broad unqualified language of Maryland's
adoption statute, it was not the intention of the Legislature that any individual
may be adopted by any adult." Green, 338 Md. at 124,656 A.2d at 775 (1995)
(quoting with approval the court of special appeals's decision in that case)
(emphasis added). This is contrary to Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 1, 12, 497
A.2d 142, 147 (1985), in which the court, interpreting this statute, held that
"~]n view of the broad, unqualified wording of Maryland's adoption statute
... we are unable to conclude that the Legislature intended to prohibit adoption
in all circumstances by a natural parent of a child .born out of wedlock." [d.
(emphasis added). The Bridges court relied on a rule of construction which
states that "where the language of a statute is clear, courts may not insert or
omit words to make the statute express an intention not evident in its original
form." [d. at 10-11, 497 A.2d at 147. Note, however, that the language in
section 5-315(a) appears to place a restriction on the term "any adult" by
requiring that a married petitioner join their spouse in a petition for adoption.
This was not the focus of the court's discussion. A discussion of the appropriateness of this provision is beyond the scope of this paper.
143. See Green, 338 Md. at 128-29, 656 A.2d at 777-78. Upon further analysis,
however, the court may have been able to identify possible social benefits to
the children of having their father's rights terminated. See supra note 23; see
also infra notes 155-68 and accompanying text.
144. The court allowed the state to bring suit to invalidate an adoption decree that
was consented to by all the parties involved. Green, 338 Md. at 123, 656 A.2d
at 775. In Green, the father and the children consented to the adoption, as
did the mother by filing for the adoption. [d. at 123, 656 A.2d at 774; see
also infra notes 169-88 and accompanying text.
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Statutory Construction

According to section 5-309(a), "[a]ny adult may petition a court
to decree an adoption. "146 Yet in Green, 147 the court violated the
basic rule of statutory construction it had embraced in Bridgesl48
which stated that "where the language of a statute is clear, courts
may not insert or omit words to make the statute express an intention
not evident in its original form." 149 The Bridges court, interpreting
section 5-309(a), held that "[i]n view of the broad, unqualified
wording of Maryland's adoption statute ... we are unable to conclude that the Legislature intended to prohibit adoption in all circumstances by a natural parent of a child born out of wedlock." ISO
In Green, the court implicitly rejected its former interpretation of
the statute,ISI holding that "'despite the broad unqualified language
of Maryland's adoption statute, it was not the intention of the
Legislature that any individual may be adopted by any adult."IS2 The
court, however, did not overrule Bridges. JS3 By not explicitly rejecting
its contradictory holding in Bridges, the court of appeals left the
lower courts with little guidance as to how to interpret the statute
in the future. ls4

145. Cf Levesque, supra note 25, at 3 (suggesting that the current welfare system
creates a "'dual system of family law,' one for poor fathers and one for the
rest of society"). See generally tenBroek, supra note 25, at 257.
146. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-309(a) (1991).
147. 338 Md. at 118-31, 656 A.2d at 773-79.
148. 304 Md. 1, 12, 497 A.2d 142, 147 (1985).
149. Id. at 10-11, 497 A.2d at 147.
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Note, however, that the court did not overrule Bridges. See Green, 338 Md.
at 130, 656 A.2d at 778.
152. Id. at 124, 656 A.2d at 775 (quoting with approval Green v. Sollenberger, 100
Md. App. 686, 642 A.2d 324 (1994), a/I'd Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md.
118, 656 A.2d 773 (1995» (emphasis added).
153. See id. at 130, 656 A.2d at 778 (stating that "[t]he situation before us in the
instant case is very different from that presented in Bridges. ").
154. It may be argued that the court of appeals was directing the lower courts to
make a distinction between adopting one's own legitimate child and adopting
one's own illegitimate child. A closer examination of Bridges, however, reveals
that it would be inappropriate to draw this distinction because the children in
both cases were legitimate. See infra notes 169-76 and accompanying text for
a discussion of drawing a distinction between Bridges and Green based on
legitimacy.
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Social Bene/It
In Green, the court concluded that "no beneficial consequences

will attach as a result of an adoption that these children do not
already enjoy as Green's legitimate children" ISS and that the children
would, in fact, lose benefits.ls6 There is strong authority in support
of this position. IS7 In so holding, however, the Green court, as have
other courts, failed to examine the full range of possibilities.
First, in analyzing potential losses the children might suffer, the
court placed too great an emphasis on monetary losses. Four of the
five losses identified by the court were economic. lss This narrow
focus prevented the court from recognizing that children do not
necessarily benefit from efforts to force fathers to pay child support
and that, in fact, the children may actually suffer .IS9 The final
potential loss discussed by the court - that the children would "lose
the opportunity to have any sort of filial relationship with their
155. Green, 338 Md. at 130, 656 A.2d at 778.
156. Id at 128-29, 656 A.2d 777-78; see supra text accompanying notes 125-27.
157. See Green, 338 Md. at 130, 656 A.2d at 779; see also, e.g., Marshall v.
Marshall, 239 P. 36, 38 (Cal. 1925); In re Adoption of Kohorst, 600 N.E.2d
843, 847 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); In re Adoption of Graham, 409 N.E.2d 1067
(Ohio Ct. C.P. 1980); Leake v. Grissom, 614 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Okla. 1980);
In re Estate of Baxter, 827 P .2d 184, 187 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992); Campbell v.
Kindred, 554 P.2d 599, 600-01 (Or. Ct. App. 1976). But see McDonald v.
Hester, 155 S.E.2d 720 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); In re Curran, 49 N.E.2d 432,
434 (Mass. 1943).
158. See Green, 338 Md. at 130, 656 A.2d at 779. First, the court noted, the
children would lose their right to any current support from their father. See
id at 128, 656 A.2d at 778. The second potential loss identified by the court
WlL'l loss of the right to future support from their father. See id. Third, the
court noted, the children would forfeit their right to take by intestacy from
and through their father. See id. And, fourth, the children would lose the
right to bring a wrongful death action on the father's behalf. See id.
159. Cj. Levesque, supra note 25, at 37. It is insignificant to the children involved
where the money comes from as long as they are provided for. Thus, if Green
receives benefits from the state the children will not suffer. The state and its
citizens may suffer from having to pay for benefits, but this should not be
confused with what is in the best interests of the children. Moreover, Levesque
suggests that efforts to force fathers to pay child support may actually harm
the children. See Levesque, supra note 25, at 37. Levesque argues that often
fathers do not have the resources to pay child support and are unwilling to do
so. See id. Significantly, that is the case with Lenick who, prior to the adoption,
was consistently either behind in his payments or did not pay at all. See Green,
338 Md. at 122, 656 A.2d at 775. In fact, it was for this reason that Green
signed over the child support payments in order to receive benefits from AFDC.
See id. See infra notes 178-84 and accompanying text (suggesting that Green's
collection of AFDC benefits was what prompted the state to get involved and
protest an adoption otherwise consented to by all parties concerned). See
generally Levesque, supra note 25, at 31-32 (arguing that efforts to enforce
fathers' child support obligations are not cost effective).

218

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 26

father, "160
is illusory. 161 Often fathers, as in Green, elect not to
be part of their children's lives. In such cases, forcing fathers to pay
child support payments is unlikely to make them more amenable to
developing a relationship with their children. 162
Upon further analysis, the court might have also been able to
identify various possible benefits. The children might have benefitted
from the finality of an adoption through protection from future
disturbance by their father .163 Maryland statutory law implicitly recognizes the importance of such stability following an adoption in
section 5-303 which states that one of the purposes of the adoption
statutes is to protect "adoptive parents ... from a future disturbance
of their relationship with the child by a natural parent."I64 The court
of appeals should have recognizect that children who remain with
one natural parent might similarly benefit. Given the emotional
trauma children experience when their parents divorce, a child might
benefit from the stability of knowing precisely which parent or
parents will remain in their lives. 16S Moreover, if the children's ties
to their father are severed through an adoption, the children escape
the possibility of being forced to support their father if he becomes
destitute. 166
The foregoing are just a few examples of possible situations in
which a child could benefit from the permanent termination of a
relationship with a natural parent. Although this adoption may not
have been the ideal way to terminate a natural parent's relationship,

160. Green, 338 Md. at 129, 656 A.2d at 778.

161. Cj. Levesque, supra note 25, at 42 (suggesting that when the state attempts to
enforce child support obligations of natural fathers the intended benefits to
children and mothers are "more spurious than real").
162. See Levesque, supra note 25, at 40-41 (suggesting that fathers rarely develop
social relationships with children they are forced to support).
163. Cf" e.g., Qureshi v. Prince George's County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 11 Md.
App. 615, 276 A.2d 675 (1971) (recognizing that the foundation underlying all
adoptions is the need to .surround the final decree with a high degree of
certainty).
164. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-303(b)(3)(ii) (1991).
165. Cf, Levesque, supra note 25, at 19-20 (stating that one criticism of AFDC is
that it undermines family stability).
166. See In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. 2152A, 2153A, 2154A, 100 Md. App.
262,641 A.2d 889 (1994) (holding that termination of a person's parental rights
through adoption negates the child's duty to support that parent under § 13102). Section 13-102(a) provides that "[iJf a destitute parent is in this State
and has an adult child who has or is able to earn sufficient means, the adult
child may not neglect or refuse to provide the destitute parent with food,
shelter, care, and clothing." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 13-102(a) (1991).
Section 13-103(b)(3) allows a destitute parent to file a complaint against an
adult child for failing to provide necessary food, shelter, care, and clothing.
See id. § 13-103(b)(3).
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given the holding in Carroll County Department oj Social Services
v. Edelmann,167 no alternatives were available. 168
C.

Gender and the Bridges Distinction

While the court attempted to distinguish Green from Bridges,
the two cases are, in fact, quite similar. By failing to either overrule
Bridges or properly distinguish the two cases, the court granted
greater protection to children's relationships with their father than
children's relationships with their mother.
The court claimed these cases are distinguishable because the
child in Bridges stood to gain greater rights from the adoption, 169
while the children in Green would be adversely affected by the
adoption. 170 A closer look, however, reveals that in each case the
children would be losing a parent, while purportedly gaining nothing.
While the child in Bridges l7l was born out of wedlock, the child's
father had clearly established his paternity by the time he attempted
to adopt his child.172 The father's name was on the child's birth
certificate. 173 Additionally, the father had acknowledged his paternity
in writing, and this had formed the basis for a court's recognition
of his paternity.I74 Moreover, the father had physical custody of the
child. 175 Likewise, in Green, the mother had custody.176 Thus, in each
case, the parent attempting to adopt was already the legitimate parent
of the children to be adopted.
In both cases, the court acknowledged that the adoption would
have the effect of severing the other parent's ties to the children. In
Green, 177 the court invalidated the adoption because of this concern. 178
In Bridges, however, the court remanded to determine whether it
167. 3~ Md. 150, 577 A.2d 14 (1990).
168. See id. at 175-76, 577 A.2d at 26. In Edelmann, the court held that the only
way to terminate a parent's rights was through guardianship or adoption. See
id.
169. See Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 129, 656 A.2d 773, 778 (1995).
170. See id. at 128, 656 A.2d at 778. See supra part IV.B for a discussion of
potential benefits and losses.
171. 304 Md. 1, 497 A.2d 142 (1985).
172. See id. at 2-3, 497 A.2d at 142-43. See supra note 74 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Maryland's legitimation statute.
173. See Bridges, 304 Md. at 3, 497 A.2d at 142-43.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 3, 497 A.2d at 1143.
176. See Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 129, 656 A.2d 773, 778 (1995). Note
that unwed mothers, unlike unwed fathers, need not establish that a child is
their biological child; it is presumed. Cf. MD. CODE. ANN., FAM. LAW § 5310 (1991) (describing "criteria" for being a natural father).
177. 338 Md. 118, 656 A.2d 773 (1995).
178. See id.
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would be in the child's best interest "to grant the adoption and thus
terminate all of his parental ties to his mother. "179 The Bridges court,
thus, implicitly recognized that cutting off one natural parent's rights
in favor of the other might be in a child's best interest. 18o When
faced with severing the father's rights in Green, however, the court
saw it as an impermissible misuse of the adoption process. 181
Furthermore, the Bridges court did not find, as the Green court
concluded, that "the child acquired greater rights as an adopted child
than had the child merely been acknowledged under the legitimation
statute." 182 The Bridges court stated that it was unclear whether the
child would acquire any greater rights if adopted and remanded the
case for a determination of this issue. 183 Thus, it is unclear whether
the child would actually have gained any benefit that would have
been recognized by the court in Green. 184
What makes a decision based on this distinction even less compelling is the fact that in Green the father consented,185 while in Bridges,
the mother refused to consent. 186 In fact, in Bridges, the child's custody
was the subject of pending litigation. l87 While the court appears to
question the mother's motives in Green, the court had an equal or
greater reason to question the father's motives in Bridges.
When read together, these decisions demonstrate the court's willingness to terminate a child's relationship to his or her mother, while
evidencing the court's reluctance to sever a similar relationship with the
father. 188
D.

State Intervention in the Familj89

In Green v. Sollenberger,19O the court espoused a rigid deflnition
of family and gave the state the power to intercede to enforce it. 191 The
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Bridges, 304 Md. at 14, 497 A.2d at 148.
See id.
See Green, 338 Md. at 129, 656 A.2d at 778.
Id.
See Bridges, 304 Md. at 14, 497 A.2d at 148.
See supra part IV.B.
See Green, 338 Md. at 123, 656 A.2d at 775.
See Bridges, 304 Md. at 3, 497 A.2d at 143.
See id.
But see supra note 154.
See generally Levesque, supra note 25, at 20. Levesque wrote that regulating
the relationships among family members has traditionally been beyond the
domain of the courts. See id. He suggested, however, that the courts have
become increasingly involved in the family as a result of welfare reform
proposals and policies. See id. at 20-21.
190. 338 Md. 118, 656 A.2d 773 (1995).
191. See id.
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court allowed the state to bring suit to invalidate an adoption decree
that was consented to by all the parties involved. l92 The father and the
children consented to the adoption, as did the mother by filing for the
adoption. 193
The court's decision reaffirmed a rigid construction of family.l94
This is illustrated by the court's suggestion that had Green's husband
been named in the petition for adoption, it would have been valid. l9S
Although failure to join her husband was itself a violation of section
5-315,ISli the court was more concerned that "by failing to join her new
husband in the adoption petition [Green] effectively left her children
fatherless." 197 The narrow view of the family espoused by this court,
as well as in section 5-315, may have a lasting impact on nontraditional
families. l98 For example, the court seems to suggest that, while a mother
and a father are fully capable of raising children, a single mother is
not. 199 Significantly, Maryland law expressly provides for adoption by
a single mother ,100 Further, in light of this case, one must also wonder
why the court in Bridges remanded to determine if it would be in the
children's best interest to terminate the mother's rights, thus implying
that a single father could raise a child.

192. See id. at 123, 656 A.2d at 775.
193. See id.
194. See generally Levesque, supra note 25, at 27 (stating that despite the reality
"there remains the ingrained notion of the nuclear family as the 'family'
prototype"). The reality, Levesque explains, is that there has been a dramatic
increase in the proportion of children living in single parent homes. See id.
Levesque argues that this idealized conception of family has hindered legal
reform. See id. at 27 n.146 (citing with approval Margaret L. Andersen,
Feminism and the American Family Ideal, 22 J. COMPo FAM. STUD. 235 (1991».
195. See Green, 338 Md. at 129, 656 A.2d at 778.
196. Section 5-315 provides that "[i]f petitioner for adoption is married, the petitioner's spouse shall join the petition." FAM. LAW § 5-315.
197. Green, 338 Md. at 129, 656 A.2d at 778 (emphasis added).
198. Cf, Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Families Through Surro-Gay
Arrangements: A Paradigm For Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER
& L. 183 (1995) (evaluating possibilities for gay parenthood).
199. It may be argued that the court was merely pointing out that by not joining
her husband she was not following Maryland law. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 5-315(a) (1991) ("If a petitioner for adoption is married, the petitioner's
spouse shall join in the petition .... "). The language used by the court,
however, indicates that this was not their main concern. The court mentions
this violation only in a footnote. See Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 129
n.5, 656 A.2d 773, 778 n.5 (1995). Moreover, in the text of its opinion, the
court states "Green, by failing to join her new husband in the adoption
petition, has effectively left her children fatherless . ... " Id. (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
200. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. But see MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 5-315(a) (1991) ("If a petitioner for adoption is married, the petitioner's
spouse shall join in the petition .... ").
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Moreover, legal scholars have suggested that adoption is an important vehicle for allowing gay couples, who are unable to legally
marry, to take on equal legal roles in a child's life. 201 This inevitably
requires the termination of the rights of one of the biological parents. 202
This decision may also have an impact on the related issue of surrogate
motherhood, which requires the natural parent keeping the child to
adopt the child. 203

E.

Welfare, Adoption, and Poverty: A Dual System

The significance of Green's AFDC payments should not be overlooked. Green would be a very different case, and probably would not
have been brought at all, had Green and her children not been dependent
on the state. Green, Lenick, and her children all consented to the
adoption. 204 It took the involvement of the Executive Director of
Maryland's Child Support Enforcement Agency, to challenge the existing
adoption decree.lOS In fact, the Executive Director did not become
involved until Lenick fIled a petition in a Pennsylvania court to be
relieved of his child support obligations. 206
Monetarily, the granting of such a petition would make no difference to Green or her children. At that point, Lenick's payments had
been assigned to the State of Maryland due to his continuing failure to
pay on time or, at times, his failure to make payments at all.207 The
state then intervened to prevent the Pennsylvania court from allowing
him to escape his obligation. 2aI The state would have had no reason to
become involved had Green not been receiving AFDC payments. More
than a year had passed since a Maryland court had granted the
adoption.209 It was only when Lenick attempted to have the Pennsylvania
court relieve him of his obligations to the children that the State of
Maryland became concerned that an adoption of children by their
natural mother might be against public policy. 210

201. See Hollandsworth, supra note 198, at 234-39.
202. See id. at 235. Professor Hollandsworth suggests that termination of the birth

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

mother's rights is necessary "[t)o avoid the legal uncertainty created by merely
placing the child in the father's custody and to effectuate the legal creation of
the gay family." Id. at 234.
See id.
See Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 123, 656 A.2d 773, 775 (1995).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 122, 656 A.2d at 775.
See id. at 123, 656 A.2d at 775.
See id.
See id.
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This is important because it suggests a dual system of both welfare
and adoption - one for the poor and one for the rest of society.211 If
the state only becomes involved in cases of natural parent adoption
when the natural parent is receiving AFDC, then only poor women will
be prevented from adopting their own children. Women with other
means of support will be able to escape such state scrutiny. 212 While
many would argue that it is unfair for the state to be forced to support
children just because their fathers do not want anything to do with
their children, it is equally unfair to subject poor women to additional
scrutiny and reduced stability in their relationship with their children.213
Moreover, a child's best interest and relationship with his or her parents
should not be dictated by the amount of money their parents have.

V.

CONCLUSION

Stambaugh v. Child Support Enforcement AdministratiorP-14 suggested that Maryland courts should not allow one parent to consent to
adoption in order to terminate child support payment arrearage. 21S Yet,
Maryland adoption law provides for natural parents to consent to the
211. Sir! Levesque, supra note 25, at 6 (suggesting that the current welfare system
creates a "'dual system of family law,' one- for poor fathers and one for the
rest of society"). Levesque notes that assignment of poor women's support
rights to the state was purportedly implemented to protect poor women. See
id. at 35. Significantly, Levesque argues, poor women strenuously opposed
such reforms for a variety of reasons. See id. For example, it is argued, such
assignments do not always, or even often, benefit the children. See id. at 37.
Furthermore, women and their children may, in fact, wind up with less money
- than if they had not assigned their rights. See id. at 36. Finally, there is a
potential that a man forced by the state to pay child support may counter-sue
for custody in order to avoid child support obligations even when the father
has no interest in actually raising the children. See id.
212. Cf Yvette Marie Barksdale, And the Poor Have Children: A Harm-Based
Analysis oj Family Caps and the Hollow Procreative Rights oj Welfare
Beneficiaries, 14 LAW & INEQUITY: A JOURNAL OF THEORY & PRACTICE, Dec.
1995, at 1 (discussing proposed welfare reform and the impact these proposals
would have on recipients). According to Barksdale, many of these "proposals
appear designed to punish welfare recipients for violating" traditional societal
norms "and to manipulate recipients into complying with these norms." [d.
at 3 (citations omitted). For example, recipients are rewarded for marrying by
some programs. See id.
213. Of particular concern, given Levesque's suggestion, is that a real threat exists
that a man forced by the state to pay child support may counter-sue for
custody in order to avoid child support obligations despite the fact that the
father has no interest in actually raising the children. See Levesque, supra note
25, at 36.
214. 323 Md. 106, 591 A.2d 501 (1991).
215. See id.; See also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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adoption of their children 216 and for the adoption of a child by a single
parent.217
The adoption of a legitimate child by his or her natural parents
appeared to be permissible after Bridges v. Nicely.2ls However, in Green
v. Sollenberger, the court of appeals departed from this position and
declared a mother's adoption of her own natural children invalid. 219
While the distinction between Green and Bridges may illustrate the
court's own struggle with these intricacies of family law, the decision
is troubling. Denying a natural mother the right to adopt her own child
mayor may not be good policy, but what is clear is the need for more
consistency.

Jennifer R. Terrasa
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See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
338 Md. 118, 656 A.2d 773 (1995).

